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LEARNING TO THINK ABOUT COMPLEX
ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND
NATURAL RESOURCE LAW AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP:
A TWENTY-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE
Robin Kundis Craig*
Twenty years ago, Yale law professor Donald Elliott wrote that
"[e]nvironmental law is worthy of serious study not only for its own
importance, but also as a case history in the use of law as an
instrument of social change. Environmental law represents the state-
of-the-art in using legal institutions and techniques to manage
complex systems to achieve social goals."' His statement is important
for a number of reasons, but the one I want to focus on in this essay
is his acknowledgement that the environment is a complex system -
an acknowledgement that has become an increasingly important part
of environmental law scholarship and that desperately needs to
become a more prominent part of environmental and natural
resources law and policy. In particular, grappling with ecological
complexity through new legal tools offers one of the best prospects
for dealing with the impacts of climate change - i.e., engaging in
climate change adaptation - in the decades to come. Because climate
change is the environmental and natural resources problem (not to
2
mention social, cultural, and economic problem) of the 21st century,
it is well worth reviewing how scientific concepts of complexity and
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1. E. Donald Elliott, Environmental Lan, at a Crossroad, 20 N. KY. L. REV. 1,
2(1992).
2. See Alexandra B. Klass, Climate Change and the Convergence of
Environmental and Energy Law, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 180, 181 (2013)
(stating that the resurgence of states and private parties relying on traditional
common law theories to address today's environmental challenges highlight
climate change as the focal point in environmental law).
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systems theory have become an active component of the
environental and natural resources law conversation in scholarship.
Scientists - particularly biologists and ecologists but also, notably,
computer scientists and information systems analysts - have
increasingly recognized that both natural systems and human
societies are complex systems - that is, systems where seemingly
simple entities or components self-organize into intricate and
interrelated networks of functions, products, and responses.3 Thus,
"[i]n complex systems, many simple parts are irreducibly entwined,
and the field of complexity is itself an entwining of many different
fields."4 Examples of complex systems include insect colonies,
immune systems, brains, and economies' - and, many would argue,
law.6
Complexity scientists generally distinguish complex systems from
complicated systems.7 As John Miller and Scott Page have explained:
In a complicated world, the various elements that make up
the system maintain a degree of independence from one
another. Thus, removing one such element (wvhich reduces
the level of complication) does not fundamentally alter the
system's behavior apart from that which directly resulted
from the piece that was removed. Complexity arises when
the dependencies among the elements become important. In
such a system, removing one such element destroys system
3. See generally MELANIE MITCHELL, COMPLEXITY: A GUIDED TOUR 4 (2009).
4. Id.
5. See id. at 4-12.
6. See Gregory Todd Jones, Dynamical Jurisprudence: Lami as a Complex
System, 24 GA. STATE U. L. REV. 873 (2008); see also J.B. Ruhi, Law's
Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 885 (2008); Eric Kades, The Law's of
Complexity and the Complexity of Laws: The Implications of Computational
Complexity Theory for the Law, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 403 (1997); J.B. Ruhl, The
Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and
Society and Its Practical Meaning for Society., 49 VAND. L. REV. 1406 (1996); J.B.
Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society
System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the AIodern Administrative
State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849 (1996).
7. See generally JOHN H. MILLER & ScOTT E. PAGE, COMPLEX ADAPTIVE
SYSTEMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SOCIAL LIFE 4
(2007).
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behavior to an extent that goes well beyond what is
embodied by the particular element that is removed.
To dramatize the point: "A complex system dies when an element is
removed, but complicated ones live on, albeit slightly
compromised." 9
What I and many other scholars have begun to argue is that
environmental and natural resources law have long treated the
environment - landscapes and public lands, ecosystems, watersheds -
as complicated systems capable of being managed for individual
components, when in fact they have always been complex adaptive
systems.10 Moreover, as complex adaptive systems, the subjects of
environmental law (the objects, of course, are the human actors who
affect the environment and natural resources) have frequently
responded unpredictably to this often misguided approach to
governance. The mismatch of legal component-based thinking and
ecological complexity has perhaps become most obvious in the
stock-based approach to fisheries management that has dominated in
the United States under the Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries
Management and Conservation Act' and the species-focused
approach to biodiversity preservation under the Endangered Species
8. Id at 9.
9. Id
10. See infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
11. See 16 U.S.C. § 1801-1884 (2006). For discussions of the failures of
fisheries management., see Eric Biber, WYhich Science? Whose Science? How
Scientific Disciplines Can Shape Environmental Law, 79 U. CHL L. REV. 471, 488-
93 (2012); see also D. Ludwig, Fishing Down the Food Web, in PANARCHY:
UINDERSTAINDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 4. Box
1-I (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002).
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Act.12 Climate change is simply exacerbating our awareness of the
mismatch.13
Complex systems have several distinguishing properties. First, they
exhibit complex collective behavior - that is, individual components,
following readily discernible rules of behavior, act collectively in
vast numbers to "give rise to the complex, hard-to-predict, and
changing patterns of behavior that fascinate us."14 This property is
often referred to as the self-organizing nature of complex systems,
and the difficult-to-predict results are deemed emergent behaviors or
properties. Explaining how this "emergent self-organized behavior
comes about" is the central enterprise of complexity science.16
Second, complex systems exhibit signaling and information
processing - that is, they "produce and use information and signals
12. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1540 (2006). For discussions of the inadequacies of
species regulation, see Kalvani Robbins, Missing the Link: The Importance of
Keeping Ecosystems Intact and What the Endangered Species Act Suggests We Do
About It, 37 ENVTL. L. 573 (2007); J.B. Ruhl, Taking Adaptive Management
Seriously: A Case Study of the Endangered Species Act, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1249
(2004); J.B. RuhI, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System:
How to Clean Up the Environment By Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34
Hous. L. REV. 933. 935-36 (1997); Alyson C. Flournoy, Coping with Complexity,
27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 809, 813-16 (1994).
13. Robin Kundis Craig, "Stationarity Is Dead"-Long Live Transformation:
Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9.
10-18, 31-39 (2010).
14. MITCHELL, supra note 3, at 12. See also NEIL F. JOH-NSON, Two's
COMPANY, THREE IS COMPLEXITY 13, 15 (2007) (noting that a complex system
"contains a collection of many interacting objects or 'agents."' that it "exhibits
emergent phenomena which are generally surprising, and may be extreme," and
that "the emergent phenomena typically arise in the absence of any sort of
'invisible hand' or central controller.").
15. See MITCHELL, supra note 3., at 13: see also MILLER & PAGE, supra note 7,
at 9 ("The behavior of many complex systems emerges from the activities of lower-
level components."); JOLNSON, supra note 14, at 5-9 (discussing emergent behavior
and giving examples from a number of areas).
16. MITCHELL, supra note 3, at 13. See also JoINsoT, supra note 14, at 3-4
("Complexity Science can be seen as the study of the phenomena which emerge
from a collection of interacting objects. . . ."), 5 ("The Holy Grail of Complexity
Science is to understand, predict and control such emergent phenomena-in
particular, potentially catastrophic crowd-like effects such as market crashes, traffic
jams, epidemics., illnesses such as cancer, human conflicts, and environmental
change.").
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from both their internal and external environments."' 7 As Neil
Johnson has emphasized, the behavior of objects in a complex system
"is affected by memory or 'feedback,'" meaning "that something
from the past affects something in the present, or that something
going on at one location affects what is happening at another. . . ."
Thus, complex systems are linked systems, both temporally and
spatially. Moreover, "the nature of this feedback can change with
time." 9 In other words, how components of the system respond to
each other and to outside stimuli is also subject to evolution and
change.
Finally, complex systems "adapt - that is, change their behavior to
improve their chances of survival or success - through learning or
evolutionary processes."20 As a result, complex systems - sometimes
more specifically referred to as "complex adaptive systems" 21  are
dynamic systems because "they change over time in some way."22
The dynamic capabilities of complex systems, combined with their
emergent behaviors, can give these systems a certain degree of
resilience, or ability to cope with changes to and around the system.
Thus, "[w]hile complex systems can be fragile, they can also exhibit
an unusual degree of robustness to less radical changes in their
,,23
component parts. Specifically, the emergence that such systems
display typically "is the result of a very powerful organizing force
that can overcome a variety of changes to the lower-level
components."24
Definitions of complex systems emphasize these components. For
example, Melanie Mitchell, a computer scientist and External
Professor with the Santa Fe Institute, has defined complex systems to
be "a system in which large networks of components with no central
control and simple rules of operation give rise to complex collective
17. MITCHELL, supra note 3, at 13.
18. JOH-NsON, supra note 14, at 14.
19. Id
20. MITCHELL, supra note 3., at 13; see also JoHNsoN, supra note 14, at 14
("The objects can adapt their strategies according to their history.").
21. MITCHELL, supra note 3., at 13.
22. Id at 15.
23. MILLER & PAGE, supra note 7, at 9.
24. Id
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behavior, sophisticated information processing, and adaptation via
learning or evolution."25
One of the important lessons for environmental and natural
resources law from complexity science is that uncertainty and
unpredictability are inherent limitations on the legal system's ability
to perfectly control and regulate its subjects, whether those subjects
be social systems, ecological systems, or the important and dynamic
intersection of the two, generally referred to as socio-ecological
systems. As John Miller and Scott Page have emphasized, "At the
most basic level, the field of complex systems challenges the notion
that by perfectly understanding the behavior of each component part
of a system we can then understand the system as a whole."26 Or, as
Neil Johnson has more colorfully summarized, complexity theory
"represents a slap in the face for traditional reductionist approaches
to understanding the world."27
This is the challenge that systems theory and complexity science
pose to the future of environmental and natural resources law
scholarship, even as climate change provides an ever-increasing
impetus for meeting that challenge: How do we transform
environmental and natural resources law into governance systems
that can cope with continual change, ever-present uncertainty, and
the potential for catastrophic (at least from a human perspective)
threshold crossings in socio-ecological systems? Luckily, complexity
scientists and others are also beginning to offer tools that might help
the legal scholars meet this challenge, among them adaptive
management,28 panarchy theory,2 9 and resilience theory.30
25. MITCHELL,supra note 3, at 13.
26. MILLER & PAGE, supra note 7, at 3.
27. JO1NSON, supra note 14., at 17.
28. See, e.g., John H. Davidson & Thomas Earl Geu, The Missouri River and
Adaptive Management: Protecting Ecological Function and Legal Process, 80
NEB. L. REV. 816 (2001) (discussing adaptive management in the context of
complex systems theory); see also Itzchak E. Kornfeld, Adaptive Resource
Management in Complex Systems., 26 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT. 29 (2012) J.B.
Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 424, 438-39 (2010); Douglas E. Noll, Searching for the Zone of
Reasonableness. 8 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 59, 70-72 (1998) (describing the
use of adaptive management as an acknowledgement of the complexity of
ecosystems); J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management - Is It Possible?, 7
MiNN. J.L. ScL & TECH. 21 (2005).
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Nevertheless, the incorporation of complexity theory into
environmental and natural resources law scholarship remains nascent,
albeit growing, especially from the perspective of finding an
adequate governance system for climate change adaptation. Prior to
1992, legal scholarship did occasionally acknowledge that "the
environment," however defined, was a complex system, but such
acknowledgements were rare and undeveloped. For example, in a
1980 Texas Laiw Review Note, Howard Marek quoted the
congressional testimony of David M. Gates, Director of the Missouri
Botanical Gardens, during the enactment of the National
Environental Policy Act ("NEPA"), for the proposition that
"[t]oday we are manipulating an extremely complex system: The
ecosystems of the earth, the units of the landscape, and we do not
know the consequences of our actions until it is too late. We need to
study ecosystems in advance and work out the strategies of living
with the landscape."3  To a more legal effect, in 1983 Terrence
29. See, e.g., Ahjond S. Garmestani, Craig R. Allen & Heriberto Cabezas,
Panarchy, Adaptive M'anagement and Governance: Policy Options for Building
Resilience, 87 NEB. L. REV. 1036 (2009); C.S. Holling et al., Sustainability and
Panarchies, in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND
NATURAL SYSTEMS 63-102 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002)
(describing the importance of panarchy theory's nested hierarchies of resilience
loops).
30. See, e.g, C.S. Holling & Lance H. Gunderson, Resilience and Adaptive
Cycles, in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND
NATURAL SYSTEMS 25-62 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002)
(describing the four-stage looped model of resilience); BRIAN WALKER & DAVID
SALT, RESILIENCE THINKING: SUSTAINING ECOSYSTEMS AND PEOPLE IN A
CHANGING WORLD (2006); see also Robin Kundis Craig., Legal Remedies for Deep
Marine Oil Spills and Long-Term Ecological Resilience: A Mlatch Made in Hell,
2011 BYU L. REV. 1863, 1886-96; BRIAN WALKER & DAVID SALT, RESILIENCE
PRACTICE: BUILDING CAPACITY TO ABSORB DISTURBANCE AND MAINTAIN
FUNCTION (2012); Barbara Cosens, Transboundary River Governance in the Face
of Ui ncertainty: Resilience Theory and the Columbia River Treaty, 30 J. LAND RES.
& ENVTL. L. 229, 231-42 (2010); see Craig, supra note 13., at 39-40: FOUNDATIONS
OF ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE (Lance H. Gunderson et al. eds., 2010); Barbara
Cosens, Resolving Conflict in -Non-Ideal, Complex Systems: Solutions for the Law-
Science Breakdown in Environmental and Natural Resource Law, 48 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 257 (2008).
31. Howard R. Marek, Note, Inaction as Action U/nder Section 102(2)(C) of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 58 TEX. L. REV. 393, 413 & n1 15
(1980).
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Thatcher argued, in the context of a discussion about the Columbia
River hydroelectric dams and their effects on fish and wildlife, that:
[E]ven physically small hydro projects can have
significant, perhaps devastating, impacts. A river is a
complex system. What appear to be unimportant, perhaps
even intermittent, streams may be crucial to fish and
wildlife. In one basin in the Sierra Nevadas, biologists
discovered that forty percent of the system's cutthroat trout
were produced from one small intermittent stream, an
unlikely location that, without careful study, could have
been written off as irrelevant to the basin's fishery.32
In other words, Thatcher pointed out, because rivers are complex
systems, we should not assume that we know what's important and
wvhat's not for purposes of environmental and natural resources
management.
These early pioneers were trying to provide snapshot insights into
a concept with which neither environmental law nor its scholars were
yet prepared to grapple fully: the ecological concept of complexity,
as viewed through the lens of systems theory, more recently
"popularized" (at least academically) in the theory of panarchy and
the paradigm of resilience thinking. Instead, twenty years ago, when
enviromnental legal scholars looked for complex systems, they were
much more likely to find them in environmental law itself than in the
subjects of that law. Notably, moreover, many of these scholarly
32. Terence L. Thatcher, The Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and
Conservation Act: Fish and Wf ildlife Protection Outside the Columbia River Basin,
13 ENVTL. L. 517, 520 (1983).
33. See, e.g.. Ronald Edward Kilroy, AIaking an Oily M'ess Less AIessy: Use of
Rule F Concursus to Reduce Oil Spill Litigation Complexity., 2 ENVTL. LAW. 665
(1996); William H. Rodgers., Jr., Environmental Law Trivia Test No. 2. 22 B.C.
EiNVTL. AFF. L. REV. 807 (1995) (referring to the "theme of complexity" in
environmental law); Kurt C. Hofgard., Is This Land Really Our Land? Impacts of
Free Trade Agreements on U.S. Environmental Protection. 23 ENVTL. L. 635. 670
(1993) (referring to the United States's "complex systems of environmental
regulations"); William H. Rodgers., Jr., A Superfund Trivia Test: A Comment on the
Complexity of the Environmental Laws, 22 ENVTL. L. 417 (1992); R. Christopher
Locke, Environmental Crimes: The Absence of "Intent" and the Complexity of
Compliance, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 311 (1991); Michael C. Blumm & D. Bernard
Zaleha, Federal Wetlands Protection Under the Clean Water Act: Regulatory
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identifications of "complexity" are more accurately described as
identifications of complicated issues and structures in enviromnental
and natural resources law. Importantly, however, as complexity
theory has been increasingly absorbed into environmental and natural
resources legal scholarship, the theoretical construction of that body
of law as its own complex system has also become correspondingly
richer. 4
With respect to ecosystems and the societies that depend upon
them, beginning in about 1992, references to the subjects of
environmental and natural resources law as complex systems began
to become more common. Thus, for example, scientist Nathan Buras
closed a legal conference at the University of Arizona by
emphasizing that both the enviromnent and energy are "dynamic and
extremely complex systems."35  Michael Donnellan defined
"ecosystems" as "complex systems where interdependent species of
plants and animals live together." 36 Similarly, Michael McGinnis
emphasized that "[e]cosystems are open, changing, and complex
Ambivalence, Intergovernmental Tension, and a Call for Reform, 60 U. COLO. L.
REV. 695, 699 (1989) ("Congress has been unwilling to assign the Corps plenary
authority over wetlands regulation. Instead, it has ratified a complex system of
interagency coordination and checks . . ."); Robert F. Blomquist, The Beauty of
Complexity, 39 HASTINGS L. J. 555 (1988) (reviewing William H. Rodgers, Jr.,
EiNVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER (1986)); Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger,
Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits
U/nder Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 916 (1985)
("According to some of the EPA's intemal evaluations, codification seems to make
a complex system of shared enforcement responsibility function more smoothly.");
Cynthia E. Carlson, Ten Years After Stockholm-International Environmental Law,
77 AM. Soc'y INT'L. L. PROC. 411, 412 (1983) (noting that "much institutional
progress has occurred in the field of international environmental law as a result of
the current complex system of organizations."); Emest L. Edwards et al.,
Constitutional and Policy Implications of Louisiana's Proposed Environmental
Energy Tax: Political Expediency or Effective Regulation?, 58 TUL. L. REV. 215,
220 (1983) (describing "the complex system of exemptions and credits designed to
immunize in-state concems from the effects of the First Use Tax.").
34. See e.g, J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive
System: How to Clean Up the Environment by M'aking a Mess of Environmental
Law, 34 HOus. L. REV. 933 (1997).
35. Nathan Buras, Closing Reflections, 9 ARIZ. J. INTL. & COMP. L. 273 (1992).
36. Michael T. Donnellan, Note, Transportation Control Plans under the 1990
Clean Air Act as a M'eans for Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 16 VT. L. REV.
711, 717 n.48 (1992).
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systems," simultaneously reaching a legal consequence, that "an
ecosystem approach requires an institution that crosses political and
ownership boundaries." 7 However, most if not all of these references
were little more than hand-waving statements, rather than mature
theories of how to incorporate complexity science into environmental
and natural resources law. More productive for future engagement
with true complexity theory were the pioneer legal scholars who
began to grapple with scientific revelations that ecosystems were not
steady-state systems that tended toward equilibrium but rather
continually dynamic systems that could be thrown into new states of
being.38
In 1994, Alyson Flournoy, in an essay much like this one, offered
one of the first realizations in enviromnental and natural resources
scholarship that the enterprise to which we all are committed might
be a different and more complex one than was envisioned in the
1970s, when Congress enacted most of the environmental statutes. In
"Coping with Complexity" 39 she emphasized:
[T]he ever-increasing complexity that characterizes our
relationship to the environment. Closely linked with this
theme is our limited knowledge in this area as we try to
understand and respond to the complex reality of
environmental degradation. How well we cope with this
complexity and uncertainty will be an important
37. Michael V. McGinnis, On the Verge of Collapse: The Columbia River
System, Wild Salmon, and the Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 63, 66 n.13 (1995).
38. See Fred Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science
on American Law: An Introduction. 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 869-73 (1994); E.
Donald Elliott, Law and Biology: The -New Synthesis?, 41 ST. Louis U. L. J. 595,
606 n.58 (1997) (describing the new science of complex adaptive systems);
William H. Rodgers, Jr., Adaptation of Environmental Law to the Ecologists'
Discovery of Disequilibria, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 887, 891 (1994); A. Dan
Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of
Environmental Law, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1128-44 (1994); see also Jonathan
B. Wiener, Law and the -New Ecology: Evolution, Categories, and Consequences,
22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 325, 355-56 (1995).
39. Alyson C. Flournoy, Coping with Complexity, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 809
(1994).
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determinant of the success of our regulatory enterprise in
the coming years.40
Thus, Flournoy recognized, after 25 years of experience with
environmental and natural resources law (dated to the enactment of
the National Environmental Policy Act of 196941), complexity and
uncertainty were the new challenges-a recognition in the larger
scholarly community that helped to pave the way for the importation
of complexity science. Thus, in species regulation, for example,
Flournoy noted that "[o]ne need not look beyond the well-known
controversy over protection of the northern spotted owl and old-
growth forests in the Pacific Northwest for an example of how the
complexity of environmental problems and the limits of our
understanding are inadequately accounted for under existing law." 42
Traditional wetlands regulation also fell short:
Traditional cost-benefit analysis may permit us to account
for the value of an identified wetland parcel in isolation
from the ecosystem. Yet this approach excludes values we
know to be associated with the wetland in its larger
environmental context. We are still far from being able to
quantify all the values that may be affected by wetlands
alteration. In the face of this uncertainty and complexity,
we can fall into the trap of reductionism, quantifying some
values and ignoring those we cannot fully understand or
quantify .
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act,44 in other words, tends to
approach wetlands as though they are part of, at best, complicated
systems, ignoring the ecological complexities that wetlands truly
represent. Finally, Flournoy noted "the complexity and uncertainty
that limit our understanding of toxic substances," praising new
approaches to coping with uncertainty such as expedited risk
40. Id
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h (2006).
42. Flournoy, supra note 39, at 813.
43. Id. at 816-17.
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006).
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assessment 45 Flournoy's proposed improvements to environmental
and natural resources law, however, focused on the communication
of these uncertainties and complexities to the regulated public, not on
fundamentally changing our perception of the subjects of that law:
Regulatory decisions that oversimplify the choices
involved, disguise relevant policy choices as science, or
favor the status quo automatically when faced with a
certain level of complexity or doubt encourage public
hostility. Greater public understanding of the factual and
normative conflicts embedded in regulatory policy will not
overcome the human tendency to blame others for
intractable problems and difficult choices, but it may
facilitate public acceptance of responsibility for the
tradeoffs that our regulatory policies demand.46
While Flournoy and others recognized the problems, however, J.B.
Ruhl is probably the enviromnental and natural resources law scholar
most prominently associated with the active importation of
complexity science and systems theory into law. In 1996, for
example, in "Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical
Law-and-Society System, 47 Ruhl consciously applied complexity
theory to the problem of how society influences law and vice-versa,
specifically arguing against the reductionist approaches taken by
legal theorists to that point. Thus, according to Ruhl:
[L]ike classical science, the major schools of American
legal theory have been so mired in reductionist thought that
they have failed to see the system behaviors that
throughout time have denied legal theorists the Holy Grail
of a predictive model of law. And it is precisely the failure
of American legal theory to produce a predictive model,
and legal institutions' fear of what that means, that has
promoted the rise of an administrative state built on layer
45. Flournoy, supra note 39, at 822-23.
46. Id. at 824.
47. J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical La1n-and-
Society System: A Wake-U p Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern
Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849 (1996).
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upon layer of reductionist premises. The point of this
Article, therefore, is not to espouse a theory that will allow
absolute prediction of law's impact on society, or vice
versa, as either goal is no longer scientifically rational.
Rather, the exercise is intended to allow a greater
appreciation of the forces at play in the interaction of law
and society, and which, ultimately, doom any reductionist,
prediction-oriented theory of law and legal
administration.48
A more realistic approach, he concluded, must acknowledge that:
[L]aw and society interact together, and can be thought of
as doing so in a nonlinear dynamical manner. The law-and-
society system model in this sense exhibits qualities similar
to those which scientists have observed in other natural and
social systems. For legal theory and legal institutions to
ignore the findings of dynamical systems theory, therefore,
is to remain ignorant of the underlying qualities and
evolution of the law-and-society system model.49
Ruhl has continued to work diligently toward integrating
complexity theory into legal theory generally and into environmental,
natural resources, and administrative law in particularo _ but so,
48. Id at 853.
49. Id at 927.
50. See generally J.B. Ruhl, Reconstructing the Wall of Virtue: Maxims for the
Co-Evolution of Environmental Law and Environmental Science, 37 ENVTL. L.
1063, 1073-78 (2007); J.B. Ruhi, The Co-Evolution of Sustainable Development
and Environmental Justice: Cooperation, Then Competition, Then Conflict, 9
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 161 (1999) (applying the theory of complex adaptive
systems to the relationships between sustainable development and environmental
justice); J.B. Ruhl, Sustainable Development: A Five-Dimensional Algorithm for
Environmental Law, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 31 (1999) (applying complex adaptive
systems theory to sustainability); J.B. Ruhi, The Endangered Species Act and
Private Property: A Matter of Timing and Location, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
37, 44 (1998) J.B. Ruhi, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive
System: How to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental
Law, 34 HOUSTON L. REV. 933 (1997); J.B. Ruhi & Harold J. Ruhl Jr., The Arrow
of the Law in Modern Administrative States: UJ'sing Complexity Theory to Reveal
the Diminishing Returns and Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of Law Poses to
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now, are a number of other environmental and natural resources law
scholars. Indeed, 1996 might be considered the watershed year for
complexity theory vis-x-vis environmental and natural resources law
scholarship, spurred not only by Ruhl's article, but also by a Duke
Law School symposium.5 i Ever since, such scholarship has
proceeded with ever-increasing recognition that these areas of law
need to catch up with complexity theory.52
Are we to the point where the complexity of ecosystems and socio-
ecological systems is accepted as a given by environmental and
Society, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405 (1997); J.B. Ruhi, Thinking of Mediation as a
Complex Adaptive System, 1997 BYU L. REV. 777; J.B. Ruhi, The Fitness of Law:
Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its
Practical Meaningfor Society, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996).
51. E.g., George Frampton, Ecosystem Management in the Clinton
Administration. 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 39, 46-47 (1996) (emphasizing the
importance of the new theories regarding complex adaptive systems).
52. E.g.., Jonathan P. Scoll, Flood Control on the Red River as a Complex
Environmental Decision System, 26 NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVT. 24 (2012);
Barbara Cosens, Resolving Conflict in -Non-Ideal, Complex Systems: Solutions for
the Law-Science Breakdown in Environmental and Natural Resource Law, 48
NATURAL RESOURCES J. 257 (2008); Gregory Todd Jones, Sustainability,
Complexity, and the Negotiation of Constraint, 44 TULSA L. REV. 29 (2008); Hope
M. Babcock, Chumming on the Chesapeake Bay and Complexity Theory: 1hy the
Precautionary Principle, not Cost-Benefit Analysis, Makes More Sense as a
Regulatory Approach, 82 WASH. L. REV. 505, 523-31 (2007); Mary Jane Angelo,
Embracing Ui ncertainty, Complexity, and Change: An Eco-Pragmatic Reinvention
of First-Generation Environmental Law, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 105, 109, 136-37
(2006); Erin Ryan, New Orleans, the Chesapeake, and the Future of Environmental
Assessment: Overcoming the Natural Resources Law of U/nintended Consequences,
40 U. RICH. L. REV. 981, 986-87 (2006); Jeffrey Rudd, J.B. Ruhl's "Law and
Society System": Burying Norms and Democracy UJnder Complexity Theory's
Foundation, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 551 (2005); Donald T.
Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 DUKE L.J.
915 (2005): Lee P. Breckenridge, Can Fish Own Water? Envisioning Nonhuman
Property in Ecosystems., 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 293, 298-304 (2005); Daniel
A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental
Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145 (2003); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive
Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded
Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 944 (2002); David W. Burnett, New Science
but Old Laws: The Need to Include Landscape Ecology in the Legal Framework of
Biodiversity Protection, 23 ENVIRONS: ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 47, 51-52 (1999);
Philip Garone, The Tragedy at Kesteron Reservoir: A Case Study in Environmental
History and a Lesson in Ecological Complexity, 22 ENVIRONS: ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
J. 107 (1999).
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natural resources law scholars? Probably. In a recent interview, for
example, Laurie Ristino and Sam Kalen reported to the American
Bar Association's Section on Environment, Energy, and Resources
that:
It's not that environmental problems are suddenly more
complex; rather, it's that we are waking up to their
complexity. It is worth noting that several legal scholars in
the past decade have applied complexity and systems
theories from science to critique enviromnental law and
suggest new paradigms for developing environmental
solutions. Likewise, I'm suggesting that we'll need to move
beyond old avenues to make progress in addressing
environmental protection. To do this, I think we first need
to step back and take a hard look at what parts of our legal
framework are working and which ones aren't.
Other scholars in recent works similarly accept uncertainty and
complexity as baseline environmental realities with which
environmental and natural resources law (and politics) must simply
learn to deal5 4
Nevertheless, work remains to be done. While scholars may accept
the new realities of complexity theory, much of environmental and
natural resources law remain based in paradigms of complicatedness,
predictability, and stationarity - always a bad fit to ecological reality,
53. Laurie Ristino & Sam Kalen, Is Environmental Law Serving Society?, 26
NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT. 52 (2012).
54. E.g.. Craig Antony (Tony) Arnold, Fourth Generation Environmental Lme:
Integrationist and Multimodal, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 771,
780-83 (2011); Eric Biber, Jhich Science? Whose Science? How Scientific
Disciplines Can Shape Environmental Law, 79 U. CHL L. REV. 471, 487 (2012);
Keith H. Hirokawa, Sustaining Ecosystem Services Through Local Environmental
Law, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 760, 779 (2011); Sherry A. Enzler, How Law
Mattered to the Mono Lake System, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 413,
511 (2011); Robin Kundis Craig, Legal Remedies for Deep Marine Oil Spills and
Long-Term Ecological Resilience: A Match Made in Hell, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1863,
1886-96; Wes Nicholson, Getting to Here: Bioregional Federalism, 40 EINVTL. L.
713, 716-19 (2010); Douglas A. Kysar, Ecologic: Nanotechnology, Environmental
Assurance Bonding, and Symmetric Humility, 28 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 201,
212 (2010).
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and an increasingly problematic mismatch in a climate change era.ss
Complexity theory and its related theories, especially resilience
theory, are much better theoretical foundations for environmental law
and natural resources law in an era of climate change.56 As I have
argued elsewhere, climate change has thrown law into a world of
undeniable, continuous, and often unpredictable changes to
ecosystems and the social systems that depend on them: "Stationarity
is dead.", 7 This continual change, and the perpetual threat of
threshold crossings, not only delivers the death blow to the
continuing viability of traditional structures of environmental and
natural resources law, but it also at least severely undermines, if not
outright destroys, goals of sustainability adopted world-wide,
coincidentally, twenty years ago.5 8 Complexity theory and resilience
thinking offer the brightest hope for the future of environmental and
natural resources law and policy in this climate change era, and so we
should all hope that they continue to inspire transformative
scholarship.
55. Craig, supra note 13, at 10-18, 31-39.
56. See, e.g.. Jonathan H. Adler, Water Rights, Markets, and Changing
Ecological Conditions, 42 ENVTL. L. 93, 108-09 (2012) ("Climate change., like
environmental change more broadly, requires the adoption of complex adaptive
systems. Specifically, there is a need for systems that can respond relatively rapidly
to unforeseen and unpredictable changes; systems that are capable of discovering,
dispersing, and accounting for time and place-specific information about new and
emerging demands, needs, and availabilities; and systems that allow for the
reallocation of resources in response to new challenges and opportunities. In short,
the sort of system that is required is that provided by a well-functioning market.");
Ari Bessendorf, Games in the Hothouse: Theoretical Dimensions in Climate
Change, 28 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 325, 329 (2005) ("Climate change
involves a dynamic link between the planet's ecosystem and the human
socioeconomic system, two vast and complex systems. It will take decades to
implement the fundamental change in our economic systems needed to
substantially reduce carbon emissions."); see also Daniel Schramm & Akiva
Fishman, Legal Frameworks for Adaptive Natural Resource Management in a
Changing Climate, 22 GEO. INTL. ENVTL. L. REV. 491, 502 (2010).
57. Craig, supra note 13, at 10-18, 31-39.
58. See generally Robin Kundis Craig & Melinda Harm Benson, Replacing
Sustainability, 46 AKRON L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract id=2168345 (arguing that climate
change means the death of sustainability as a regulatory and policy goal).
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